Judgements of similarity depend on the available comparative frame, not just absolute difference.

Evidence

Another key factor influencing social categorization and judgements of similarity posited in SCT is the frame of reference in which categorization occurs (Haslam and Turner 1992). Specifically, judgements of similarity vary according to the current presence of other more or less extreme positions on the relevant comparative dimension. To illustrate this effect, Haslam and Turner (1992) conducted an experiment in which participants were presented with bogus personality test scores that indicated their identity type (i.e., ‘slightly pragmatic’) and the identity type of an alleged other (i.e., ‘predominantly pragmatic’). Together with these bogus test results, participants were provided with information about the size of the frame of reference for the identity type, which could be either restricted (only three potential identity types ranging from ‘slightly pragmatic’ to ‘predominantly pragmatic’), medium (five potential identity types ranging from ‘predominantly pragmatic’ to ‘slightly non-pragmatic’) or extended (seven potential identity types ranging from ‘predominantly pragmatic’ to ‘predominantly non-pragmatic’). The results of this experiment showed that although the absolute difference between the two individuals on the comparative dimension was identical, the alleged other appeared as more similar to the self in an extended frame of reference and as less similar to the self in a restricted frame of reference. Thus, the other was assimilated to the self (i.e., categorized as an ingroup member) if the number of alternative (or more extreme) positions was high, and contrasted from the self (i.e., categorized as an outgroup member) if the number of alternative positions was low (Haslam and Turner 1992). — Anna X. Huang, Jacqueline M. Chen, and Juliane Degner, Being One or the Other, Both or Neither, 50

Specifically, judgements of similarity vary according to the current presence of other more or less extreme positions on the relevant comparative dimension. To illustrate this effect, Haslam and Turner (1992) conducted an experiment in which participants were presented with bogus personality test scores that indicated their identity type (i.e., ‘slightly pragmatic’) and the identity type of an alleged other (i.e., ‘predominantly pragmatic’). Together with these bogus test results, participants were provided with information about the size of the frame of reference for the identity type, which could be either restricted (only three potential identity types ranging from ‘slightly pragmatic’ to ‘predominantly pragmatic’), medium (five potential identity types ranging from ‘predominantly pragmatic’ to ‘slightly non-pragmatic’) or extended (seven potential identity types ranging from ‘predominantly pragmatic’ to ‘predominantly non-pragmatic’). The results of this experiment showed that although the absolute difference between the two individuals on the comparative dimension was identical, the alleged other appeared as more similar to the self in an extended frame of reference and as less similar to the self in a restricted frame of reference. — Anna X. Huang, Jacqueline M. Chen, and Juliane Degner, Being One or the Other, Both or Neither, 53

Categorization

• XREF: Connects to the reader’s interest in whether a mixed-identity member gets categorized as ingroup or outgroup depending on the frame — directly relevant to how category breadth vs. restriction pressures mixed members. — connects to: Distinction suppresses similarities just as adequation suppresses differences — Mary Bucholtz and Kira Hall, Identity and Interaction: A…, 80; Meaning arises from relations between differences, not content resemblance — Hall, Stuart, Essential Essays, Volume 1, 359; Mixed individuals’ self-similarity judgements draw on experiences and feelings, not just appearance. (+5 more)
• QUESTION: For mixed-identity individuals whose self fits no single extreme prototype, how does frame width shift where they land — assimilation to one pole, or left in the middle gap?
• corroborated: 2 independent passages support this claim — Anna X. Huang, Jacqueline M. Chen, and Juliane Degner, Being One or the Other, Both or…, 50; Anna X. Huang, Jacqueline M. Chen, and Juliane Degner, Being One or the Other, Both or…, 53

Broader Connections

• Every analogy relies on contested judgments of which similarities are relevant #corroborates (0.82) — Frederick Schauer, Thinking Like a Lawyer, 176
• Paired comparison against anchors reduces bias in absolute judgments #corroborates (0.80) — Ville Pulkki, Matti Karjalainen, Communication Acoustics- An…, 923
• Distinction suppresses similarities just as adequation suppresses differences #expands (0.78) — Mary Bucholtz and Kira Hall, Identity and Interaction, 80
• Difference is better studied relationally than as exclusionary categories. #corroborates (0.76) — David Theo Goldberg, John Solomos, A Companion to Racial and Ethnic Studies, 291
• Mixed individuals’ self-similarity judgements draw on experiences and feelings, not just appearance. #exemplifies (0.75)
• Meaning arises from relations between differences, not content resemblance #corroborates (0.72) — Hall, Stuart, Essential Essays, Volume 1, 359
• Visible physical differences trigger assumptions of deeper underlying differences. #complicates (0.72) — , Rudman, Laurie A - On the Nature of…, 113
• Qualitative difference claims reduce to differences of degree on a continuum. #complicates (0.70) — Gary Goertz, Social Science Concepts and Measurement, 400