Beneficiaries of unfair gains face reputational pressure to conceal them, with discovery risking blackmail.

Evidence

This individual is in a tough spot, according to authors Baumard et al. If people select interaction partners based on their reputation for not acquiring goods in an unfair manner, then the individual faces the bleak prospect of losing future interaction partners (even if she did nothing wrong, but simply got more than she deserved). It could thus appear safer to just conceal the unfair benefits, so that no one will know about them. This is, however, a dangerous choice. Someone could discover the deception, and the individual concealing the unfair benefits would then incur high costs, either in terms of blackmail or reputation (as she would then be considered a cheater and a deceiver). — Nicolas Baumard, A mutualistic approach to morality, 296

Categorization

• XREF: This directly parallels the reader’s own Big God/partner-choice framework: the fumi-e ritual forces exactly this concealment-vs-disclosure dilemma into public visibility, destroying partner choice through observable apostasy. — connects to: Inability to make enforceable promises can shield someone from extortion — Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, 722
• ADDENDUM: Strong supporting mechanism for ‘On Sacrifice: The Real Kind, with Corpses’ — the Greek xenia guest-gift system and Rodrigues’s privileged position as a Western priest are exactly this kind of undeservedly-acquired benefit that must be concealed or renounced publicly.

Related

• Consistent self-serving calculations send inconsistent fairness signals to a community. (similarity 0.79)

Broader Connections

• Inability to make enforceable promises can shield someone from extortion #complicates (0.80) — Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, 722