Agenda confinement and publicity neutralize extortionate threats in negotiation

Evidence

But if the bargaining representatives of the threatened party are confined to the cheese-automobile agenda, and have no instructions that permit them even to take cognizance of other commodities, or if there are ground rules that forbid mention of other tariffs while cheese and automobiles remain unsettled, this extortionate weapon must await another opportunity. If the threat that would be brought to the conference table is one that cannot stand publicity, publicity itself may prevent its effective communication. — Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, 85

Categorization

• XREF: This is the flip side of the Mafia’s power: the state’s legal forum confines the agenda (only formally legitimate claims are entertained), which is why Bonasera cannot get ‘justice’ through courts — the extortionate demand can’t get onto the legal agenda, pushing him to Vito Corleone. — connects to: Inability to make enforceable promises can shield someone from extortion — Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, 722; Bundling an extortionate demand onto a legitimate agenda makes the threat effective — Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, 84; Extortion succeeds only when bundled onto a legitimate negotiating agenda — Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, 84 (+1 more)
• ADDENDUM: Bonasera’s opening scene is precisely an agenda-confinement failure: the courtroom can only adjudicate formally cognizable wrongs, so a humiliation-without-legal-remedy must go to a private enforcer who can put everything on the agenda.

Related

• Bundling an extortionate demand onto a legitimate agenda makes the threat effective (similarity 0.84)
• Extortion succeeds only when bundled onto a legitimate negotiating agenda (similarity 0.82)

Broader Connections

• Extortion succeeds only when bundled onto a legitimate negotiating agenda #corroborates (0.92) — Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, 84