Protection must include defense against rival extortionists

Evidence

Inability to assume an enforceable promise, like inability to perform the activity demanded, may protect one from an extortionate threat. The mandatory secret ballot is a nuisance to the voter who would like to sell his vote, but protection to the one who would fear coercion. — Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, 722 (#complicates, via linked claim)

Categorization

• XREF: connects to: Inability to make enforceable promises can shield someone from extortion — Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, 722; Providers of protection require external constraints to avoid abusing customers; Mafia protection requires maintaining relations with the underworld it polices

Related

• Inability to make enforceable promises can shield someone from extortion (similarity 0.91)
• Third-party protection requires clients to be weaker than the enforcer (similarity 0.88)
• Providers of protection require external constraints to avoid abusing customers (similarity 0.83)
• Extortion succeeds only when bundled onto a legitimate negotiating agenda (similarity 0.80)
• Protection is a double-edged commodity blending shelter with extortion (similarity 0.78)

Broader Connections

• Providers of protection require external constraints to avoid abusing customers #expands (0.85)
• Mafia protection requires maintaining relations with the underworld it polices #expands (0.80)
• Inability to make enforceable promises can shield someone from extortion #complicates (0.75) — Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, 722