Law that is non-arbitrary does not make citizens unfree

Evidence

It turns out, so I argue here, that under an older, republican way of thinking about freedom, individuals in such a dominated position are straightforwardly unfree. No domination without unfreedom, even if the dominating agent stays their hand. Being unfree does not consist in being restrained; on the contrary, the restraint of a fair system of law— a non-arbitrary regime—does not make you unfree. Being unfree consists rather in being subject to arbitrary sway: being subject to the potentially capricious will or the potentially idiosyncratic judgement of another. Freedom involves emancipation from any such subordination, liberation from any such dependency. It requires the capacity to stand eye to eye with your fellow citizens, in a shared awareness that none of you has a power of arbitrary interference over another. — Philip Pettit, Republicanism, 66

Categorization

  • DEEPTHINKING: This inverts the liberal baseline: restraint by fair law is compatible with freedom; only arbitrary sway makes you unfree. A paradigm inversion, not a mere point.
  • XREF: Directly connects to the reader’s civic-republican institutional design research: it grounds what makes shared, fair institutions freedom-constituting rather than freedom-restricting. — connects to: Law can be non-arbitrary and freedom-preserving rather than inherently dominating — Philip Pettit, Republicanism: A Theory of Freedom and…, 335; Well-formed law ranks with natural obstacles, not coercive domination — Philip Pettit, Republicanism: A Theory of Freedom and…, 416; Legal agency does not require subjective intention or a human body — Talal Asad, Formations of the Secular:…, 358 (+7 more)

Broader Connections