Law can be non-arbitrary and freedom-preserving rather than inherently dominating

Evidence

It should be clear that the law need not itself represent a form of domination, under the account of domination advanced here, and that the relation of law to liberty need not be represented in Hobbesian or Benthamite terms. There will be systems of law available, at least in principle, which are entirely undominating and entirely consistent with freedom: not only will they inhibit potential dominators and reduce unfreedom, they will do so without representing a form of domination in their own right. And equally there will be systems of law that do introduce arbitrary control at some point and that do thereby embody domination and unfreedom: systems that are more or less authoritarian, in the fashion of Hobbes’s Leviathan, or America’s British legislature. These, in the old republican phrases, will represent the empire of men, not the empire of law (Harrington 1992: 8). — Philip Pettit, Republicanism, 335

Categorization

  • DEFINE: Defines the key contrast between undominating law and the ‘empire of men’ as arbitrary control.
  • XREF: connects to: Well-formed law ranks with natural obstacles, not coercive domination — Philip Pettit, Republicanism: A Theory of Freedom and…, 416; Law that is non-arbitrary does not make citizens unfree — Philip Pettit, Republicanism: A Theory of Freedom and…, 66; Freedom can be reconceived as non-domination rather than non-interference or self-mastery — Philip Pettit, Republicanism: A Theory of Freedom and…, 1207 (+4 more)

Broader Connections