Functional explanations work when behavior responds to incentives

Evidence

No animal behaves in the same way irrespective of conditions. Nor, of course, do humans. Departures from the norm are not necessarily pathologies generated by abnormal conditions. They may well be highly adaptive responses to particular ecological conditions. — Diego Gambetta, Trust - Making and Breaking Cooperative…, 443 (#expands, via linked claim)

In this experiment, the standard trust game and the mutual help trust game exhibit two very different patterns. In the standard game, the more you give, the greater are your rights to the money and the greater the amount of money you receive. In the mutual help game, the more you give to the other participant, the greater the amount of money she keeps. This contrast makes clear sense in a mutualistic morality of fairness and impartiality. Every gift creates an obligation. The character of the obligation, however, varies according to the kind of partnership involved. — Nicolas Baumard, A mutualistic approach to morality, 166 (#expands, via linked claim)

Categorization

• XREF: connects to: Behavioral departures from norms can be adaptive responses — Diego Gambetta, Trust - Making and Breaking Cooperative…, 443; Repeated interaction transforms the incentives of a one-way trust game; Future gains from continued interaction function as both incentive and sanction for trust. (+9 more)

Related

• Future gains from continued interaction function as both incentive and sanction for trust. (similarity 0.80)
• Reciprocal trust creates mutual incentives for trustworthiness (similarity 0.80)
• Parental effort allocation evolves to track changed conditions (similarity 0.79)
• Forced interdependence can generate trust almost instantly (similarity 0.79)
• Reciprocity motivations can be self-reinforcing where further interactions are plentiful (similarity 0.78)

Broader Connections

• Behavioral departures from norms can be adaptive responses #expands (0.85) — Diego Gambetta, Trust - Making and Breaking Cooperative…, 443
• Parental effort allocation evolves to track changed conditions #exemplifies (0.85)
• Future gains from continued interaction function as both incentive and sanction for trust. #expands (0.82)
• Reciprocal trust creates mutual incentives for trustworthiness #expands (0.82) — Nicolas Baumard, A mutualistic approach to morality, 166
• Repeated interaction transforms the incentives of a one-way trust game #exemplifies (0.80)
• A social equilibrium persists when agents lack incentives to change it #exemplifies (0.80)
• Conditional responses outperform probabilistic inflexible adaptations #expands (0.80)
• Hobbesian sanctions produce egoistic macro-motivation to cooperate #exemplifies (0.78) — Diego Gambetta, Trust - Making and Breaking Cooperative…, 194
• Egoistic micro-motivation lacks momentum across cases of cooperation #qualifies (0.78)