Cleaning-station outcomes emerge from learned payoff optimization, not explicit contracts.

Evidence

Due to their territoriality, individual cleaners can only win the competition with other cleaners by outbidding rather than by active interference, fitting the assumptions of biological market theory (Noë 2001). As a consequence, there is very strong convergence between cleaners with respect to the service quality they give to visitors: At 12 observed cleaning stations, visitors jolted on average either 2 or 3 times per 100 sec interaction (Bshary 2002, Fig. 1). Thus, the outcome looks as if based on a hidden contract regarding acceptable levels of cheating, but we consider it most likely that the outcome is due to individual learned optimization of own payoffs by both cleaners and clients. — Nicolas Baumard, A mutualistic approach to morality, 314

Categorization

• XREF: The ‘hidden contract’ that is really individual optimization mirrors how moral norms in Rodrigues’ Japan look consensual but are enforced through market-like constraints on partner choice. — connects to: Explicit bargaining outcomes rest on prior tacit coordination between rational players — Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, 858; Functional explanations work when behavior responds to incentives; Household economizing functions as a competitive game, not mere necessity — Simone de Beauvoir, The Second Sex, 1240

Broader Connections

• Functional explanations work when behavior responds to incentives #corroborates (0.80)
• Explicit bargaining outcomes rest on prior tacit coordination between rational players #expands (0.78) — Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, 858