Frequent repeated interaction makes cooperative trade equilibria feasible, whereas infrequent trade does not.

Evidence

Even discounting these, I would still argue that — with respect to the time span of reasonable relevance to any given generation — the spontaneous evolution of a cooperative equilibrium among humans is only just as likely as that of a noncooperative one, unless some restriction is imposed on agents’ beliefs. — Diego Gambetta, Trust - Making and Breaking Cooperative…, 2804 (#contradicts, via linked claim)

Categorization

• XREF: connects to: Cartel equilibria are more fragile than competitive ones — Diego Gambetta, The Sicilian Mafia The Business of…, 562; Cooperative equilibria are no likelier than noncooperative ones without belief restrictions — Diego Gambetta, Trust - Making and Breaking Cooperative…, 2804; Rational players can correlate strategies without communicating, even with conflicting preferences — Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, 851 (+11 more)

Related

• Cooperative equilibria are no likelier than noncooperative ones without belief restrictions (similarity 0.86)
• Repeated trade with a high discount factor enables cooperative equilibria. (similarity 0.86)
• Community boycotts can sustain cooperative trade as equilibrium without fixed trading partners. (similarity 0.82)
• Cooperative market norms can be stable equilibria even amid free-rider incentives (similarity 0.82)
• Rational backward induction alone can void all mutually beneficial exchange. (similarity 0.81)
• Repeated interaction transforms the incentives of a one-way trust game (similarity 0.80)
• Infinite repetition sustains honest exchange without any binding commitment (similarity 0.80)
• Cost-driven market ties evolve into trust-laden partnerships over time (similarity 0.80)
• Reciprocity motivations can be self-reinforcing where further interactions are plentiful (similarity 0.79)
• Anticipated future interaction makes people substantially more cooperative (similarity 0.79)
• Cooperation unravels without iterated mutual knowledge of cooperative intentions. (similarity 0.78)

Broader Connections

• Trade institutions must solve both an information and a punishment-motivation problem #expands (0.85)
• Cooperative equilibria are no likelier than noncooperative ones without belief restrictions #contradicts (0.80) — Diego Gambetta, Trust - Making and Breaking Cooperative…, 2804
• Mutual trust in iterated exchange is selffulfilling through aligned incentives #corroborates (0.80)
• Rational players can correlate strategies without communicating, even with conflicting preferences #qualifies (0.75) — Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, 851
• Cooperation can operate independently of trust #expands (0.75)
• Cooperation unravels without iterated mutual knowledge of cooperative intentions. #contradicts (0.70)