Community boycotts can sustain cooperative trade as equilibrium without fixed trading partners.

Evidence

For 6 near enough to one - specifically if 6 2 Max[p/(l + p), (a - 1)/(1 + @)I (2) - the Adjusted Tit-for-Tat strategies are a subgame perfect equilibrium in the community trading game for any matching rule M. — PAUL R. MILGRO, PAUL R. MILGRO - THE ROLE OF…, 57

Categorization

• XREF: Connects directly to the reader’s Milgrom/North/Weingast private-judge analysis and Schelling credible-commitments framing. — connects to: Community ostracism alone may be insufficient to enforce trade judgments — PAUL R. MILGRO, PAUL R. MILGRO - THE ROLE OF…, 37; Repeated trade with a high discount factor enables cooperative equilibria. — PAUL R. MILGRO, PAUL R. MILGRO - THE ROLE OF…, 47; Community reputational enforcement works even without repeated bilateral interaction between traders. — PAUL R. MILGRO, PAUL R. MILGRO - THE ROLE OF…, 65 (+10 more)

Related

• Community reputational enforcement works even without repeated bilateral interaction between traders. (similarity 0.84)
• Repeated trade with a high discount factor enables cooperative equilibria. (similarity 0.83)
• Frequent repeated interaction makes cooperative trade equilibria feasible, whereas infrequent trade does not. (similarity 0.82)
• Alternating indirect reciprocity with public goods sustains cooperation that would otherwise collapse. (similarity 0.80)

Broader Connections

• Boycotts discipline trade without requiring repeated personal dealings. #corroborates (0.85)
• Frequent repeated interaction makes cooperative trade equilibria feasible, whereas infrequent trade does not. #qualifies (0.82)
• A Law Merchant institution can sustain honest trade as an equilibrium #expands (0.78) — PAUL R. MILGRO, PAUL R. MILGRO - THE ROLE OF…, 95
• Cooperative equilibria are no likelier than noncooperative ones without belief restrictions #qualifies (0.78) — Diego Gambetta, Trust - Making and Breaking Cooperative…, 2804
• Cooperation can occur without trust when incentives align #corroborates (0.78)
• Cooperative market norms can be stable equilibria even amid free-rider incentives #corroborates (0.75) — Lisa Bernestein, Opting out of the Legal System, 190
• Cohesive minority groups sustain commerce through shared law and reputation. #corroborates (0.75) — Lisa Bernestein, Opting out of the Legal System, 182
• Withholding cooperation becomes power under high interdependence #expands (0.75)
• Small communities enforce generalized reciprocity rather than one-on-one exchange #corroborates (0.72) — Russell Hardin, Trust and Trustworthiness, 821