Mere worst-case thinking about rivals raises defensive resource allocations.

Evidence

The next set of experiments, which was part of my dissertation research, was designed to explore the effects of these psychological variables on cooperation rates in another form of social dilemma known as a “security dilemma” (see Booth & Wheeler, 2008, for a recent review of this literature). In a security dilemma, decision makers must choose between cooperative restraint and potentially escalatory security allocations. As in our earlier studies, my research colleagues and I found that decision framing and the level of salient social categorization exert strong effects on cooperative choice in this form of the dilemma as well (Kramer, 1989; Kramer, Meyerson, & Davis, 1990). Specifically, we demonstrated how the framing of a risky security allocation decision (i.e., whether resource-use decisions were framed in terms of prospective gains versus losses) influenced decision makers’ willingness to use additional resources to enhance security (and, psychologically speaking, close looming “windows of perceived vulnerability”). We also investigated how engaging in “best-case” versus “worst-case” mental simulations regarding an opponent’s intentions and possible actions affected judgment and choice. Interestingly, we found that simply having people think about worst-case possibilities regarding their opponents’ intentions and behaviors increased their willingness to allocate additional resources to protect against or offset those imagined threats. — Roderick M. Kramer, Geoffrey J. Leonardelli, Robert W. Livingston, Social Cognition, Social Identity, and…, 1955 (#corroborates, via linked claim)

Categorization

• XREF: connects to: Uncertainty, disadvantage, and competition in a setting amplify perceived threat. — Walter G. Stephan, Oscar Ybarra, Kimberly Rios Morrison, Intergroup Threat Theory, 13; Worst-case mental simulations about opponents increase security spending in security dilemmas — Roderick M. Kramer, Geoffrey J. Leonardelli, Robert W. Livingston, Social Cognition, Social Identity, and…, 1955; First-strike advantage converts defensive fear into preemptive violence spirals. — Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, 530 (+2 more)

Broader Connections

• Worst-case mental simulations about opponents increase security spending in security dilemmas #corroborates (1.00) — Roderick M. Kramer, Geoffrey J. Leonardelli, Robert W. Livingston, Social Cognition, Social Identity, and…, 1955
• Universal distrust is too costly to be a rational strategy #complicates (0.75)