Expellee leaders sought direct representation in Ostpolitik negotiations after unifying in 1958.

Evidence

Bolstered by the newfound unity, which they subsequently described as the “most decisive” development in their ranks since Potsdam, the expellee leaders wanted to play an active role at Geneva. They suspected that Germany’s eastern borders would come up in the negotiations and consequently demanded the inclusion of at least two of their “official representatives” into the government delegation. — Pertti Ahonen, Domestic Constraints on West German…, 185

Categorization

• XREF: connects to: Adenauer avoided an Ostpolitik toward Poland chiefly out of fear of upsetting expellee leaders. — Pertti Ahonen, Domestic Constraints on West German…, 134; Expellee-organization opposition, not state-interest reasoning, drove Adenauer’s Ostpolitik reversals. — Pertti Ahonen, Domestic Constraints on West German…, 238; Electoral calculations with expellee voters outweighed Ostpolitik openings for Adenauer. — Pertti Ahonen, Domestic Constraints on West German…, 245

Related

• Adenauer avoided an Ostpolitik toward Poland chiefly out of fear of upsetting expellee leaders. (similarity 0.88)
• Expellee organizations supported rigid indefinite continuation of Ostpolitik non-recognition policy. (similarity 0.85)
• Expellee-organization opposition, not state-interest reasoning, drove Adenauer’s Ostpolitik reversals. (similarity 0.84)
• Adenauer supported expellee demands instrumentally to shore up his Western policy, not from conviction. (similarity 0.84)
• Adenauer’s long tenure institutionalized expellee groups as de facto veto holders. (similarity 0.84)
• Adenauer weaponized expellee grievances to stall reunification and extract concessions (similarity 0.83)
• Electoral calculations with expellee voters outweighed Ostpolitik openings for Adenauer. (similarity 0.83)
• Adenauer publicly endorsed the expellees’ revisionist territorial claims. (similarity 0.82)
• Adenauer backed the expellee cause mainly to preempt social unrest. (similarity 0.82)
• No new Soviet provocation explains Adenauer’s July 1959 Ostpolitik about-face. (similarity 0.81)
• Expellee organizations claimed a veto role over East policy. (similarity 0.80)
• Main parties competed for leadership over the expellee constituency for instrumental reasons. (similarity 0.79)
• Expellee organizations sustained West German revanchism by reinforcing refusal to accept the postwar border (similarity 0.79)
• Electoral competition over expellee voters locked parties into rigid Cold War stances. (similarity 0.78)
• Chancellor required expellee-organization approval before any overture to eastern neighbors. (similarity 0.78)

Broader Connections

• Expellee-organization opposition, not state-interest reasoning, drove Adenauer’s Ostpolitik reversals. #expands (0.75) — Pertti Ahonen, Domestic Constraints on West German…, 238
• Electoral calculations with expellee voters outweighed Ostpolitik openings for Adenauer. #exemplifies (0.75) — Pertti Ahonen, Domestic Constraints on West German…, 245