Electoral competition over expellee voters locked parties into rigid Cold War stances.

Evidence

Hand in hand with such “positive” argumentation, intended to actively court the expellee audience, went the parties’ desire to avoid controversial public stances that might upset the expellees and thus drive them into the arms of political rivals. This line of reasoning surfaced explicitly in the internal deliberations of all three parties during the 1950s in connection with such issues as the recognition of the Oder-Neisse line or the establishment of diplomatic relations with Eastern Europe. With policies like these, the three parties maneuvered themselves into an enduring bidding war over the expellee voters and, in the process, publicly bound themselves ever more tightly to inflexible Cold War stances, which helped to build the basis for the expellee organizations’ considerable influence over Eastern policy in the Adenauer years. — Pertti Ahonen, Domestic Constraints on West German…, 171

Categorization

• XREF: This is a strong structural parallel to the reader’s core interest: manufactured/grievance-based solidarity constraining policy via electoral bidding, comparable to how a threat-constructed constituency can veto rational policy adjustment. — connects to: Hostile enemy imagery in expellee politics faded as Cold War tensions eased. — Manuel Borutta and Jan C. Jansen, Vertriebene and Pieds-Noirs in Postwar…, 916; Member-heavy parties get locked into orthodox stances that alienate the broader electorate — Anna M. Grzymala-Busse, Redeeming The Communist Past: The…, 687; Expellee organizations crystallized anti-reunification-compromise principles during Cold War polarization. — Pertti Ahonen, Domestic Constraints on West German…, 29

Related

• Expellee organizations crystallized anti-reunification-compromise principles during Cold War polarization. (similarity 0.83)
• Expellee political power eroded once generational change and border settlement removed grievances (similarity 0.83)
• Expellee organizations supported rigid indefinite continuation of Ostpolitik non-recognition policy. (similarity 0.82)
• Expellee political power rested on refusing to commit to a major party (similarity 0.81)
• Expellee groups could veto policy options but not shape policy positively (similarity 0.81)
• Main parties competed for leadership over the expellee constituency for instrumental reasons. (similarity 0.81)
• Electoral calculations with expellee voters outweighed Ostpolitik openings for Adenauer. (similarity 0.81)
• Expellee organizations enforced an orthodox policy line by punishing political deviation (similarity 0.80)
• Adenauer avoided an Ostpolitik toward Poland chiefly out of fear of upsetting expellee leaders. (similarity 0.80)
• Hostile enemy imagery in expellee politics faded as Cold War tensions eased. (similarity 0.80)
• Adenauer weaponized expellee grievances to stall reunification and extract concessions (similarity 0.79)
• Adenauer supported expellee demands instrumentally to shore up his Western policy, not from conviction. (similarity 0.79)
• Adenauer’s long tenure institutionalized expellee groups as de facto veto holders. (similarity 0.79)
• Expellee organizations sustained West German revanchism by reinforcing refusal to accept the postwar border (similarity 0.79)
• Expellee leaders sought direct representation in Ostpolitik negotiations after unifying in 1958. (similarity 0.78)

Broader Connections

• Expellee organizations crystallized anti-reunification-compromise principles during Cold War polarization. #corroborates (0.88) — Pertti Ahonen, Domestic Constraints on West German…, 29
• Hostile enemy imagery in expellee politics faded as Cold War tensions eased. #complicates (0.82) — Manuel Borutta and Jan C. Jansen, Vertriebene and Pieds-Noirs in Postwar…, 916
• Member-heavy parties get locked into orthodox stances that alienate the broader electorate #expands (0.72) — Anna M. Grzymala-Busse, Redeeming The Communist Past, 687