Adenauer backed the expellee cause mainly to preempt social unrest.

Evidence

In view of the party rivalry over these issues, it was logical that the federal government, headed by Adenauer, also became a staunch public champion of the expellee cause. The chancellor followed the domestic aspects of the problem closely. He worried about the “unbearable” “economic and political unrest” that might ensue if the expellees’ social demands went unheeded. He therefore repeatedly pressured members of his cabinet to expedite the passage of relevant legislative measures, 43. — Pertti Ahonen, Domestic Constraints on West German…, 86

Categorization

• XREF: Directly relevant to the reader’s Ostpolitik project — shows the government’s championing was strategic threat-management, not conviction, at the very outset of the Adenauer era. — connects to: Adenauer weaponized expellee grievances to stall reunification and extract concessions — Pertti Ahonen, Domestic Constraints on West German…, 156; Adenauer publicly endorsed the expellees’ revisionist territorial claims. — Pertti Ahonen, Domestic Constraints on West German…, 95; Expellee-organization opposition, not state-interest reasoning, drove Adenauer’s Ostpolitik reversals. — Pertti Ahonen, Domestic Constraints on West German…, 238 (+1 more)

Related

• Adenauer publicly endorsed the expellees’ revisionist territorial claims. (similarity 0.91)
• Expellee-organization opposition, not state-interest reasoning, drove Adenauer’s Ostpolitik reversals. (similarity 0.91)
• Adenauer supported expellee demands instrumentally to shore up his Western policy, not from conviction. (similarity 0.89)
• Adenauer weaponized expellee grievances to stall reunification and extract concessions (similarity 0.88)
• Adenauer’s long tenure institutionalized expellee groups as de facto veto holders. (similarity 0.88)
• Adenauer avoided an Ostpolitik toward Poland chiefly out of fear of upsetting expellee leaders. (similarity 0.85)
• Expellee organizations supported rigid indefinite continuation of Ostpolitik non-recognition policy. (similarity 0.83)
• Expellee leaders sought direct representation in Ostpolitik negotiations after unifying in 1958. (similarity 0.82)
• Expellee organizations crystallized anti-reunification-compromise principles during Cold War polarization. (similarity 0.82)
• Expellee organizations sustained West German revanchism by reinforcing refusal to accept the postwar border (similarity 0.82)
• No new Soviet provocation explains Adenauer’s July 1959 Ostpolitik about-face. (similarity 0.81)
• Expellee organizations enforced an orthodox policy line by punishing political deviation (similarity 0.81)
• Electoral calculations with expellee voters outweighed Ostpolitik openings for Adenauer. (similarity 0.81)
• Expellee organizations claimed a veto role over East policy. (similarity 0.80)
• Pertti Ahonen — Domestic Constraints on West German Ostpolitik The Role of the Expellee Organizations in the Adenauer Era (similarity 0.80)

Broader Connections

• Adenauer publicly endorsed the expellees’ revisionist territorial claims. #exemplifies (0.80) — Pertti Ahonen, Domestic Constraints on West German…, 95
• Expellee-organization opposition, not state-interest reasoning, drove Adenauer’s Ostpolitik reversals. #complicates (0.78) — Pertti Ahonen, Domestic Constraints on West German…, 238
• Adenauer weaponized expellee grievances to stall reunification and extract concessions #complicates (0.75) — Pertti Ahonen, Domestic Constraints on West German…, 156
• Adenauer’s long tenure institutionalized expellee groups as de facto veto holders. #expands (0.75) — Pertti Ahonen, Domestic Constraints on West German…, 248