Security rests upon a balance of trust and acceptable risk.

Evidence

Risk is not just a matter of individual action. There are “environments of risk” that collectively affect large masses of individuals—in some instances, potentially everyone on the face of the earth, as in the case of the risk of ecological disaster or nuclear war. We may define “security” as a situation in which a specific set of dangers is counteracted or minimised. The experience of security usually rests upon a balance of trust and acceptable risk. — Anthony Giddens, The Consequences of Modernity, 92

Categorization

• DEFINE: Giddens explicitly defines ‘security’ as a situation where a specific set of dangers is counteracted or minimised, resting on a balance of trust and acceptable risk.
• XREF: Directly maps onto the reader’s goal: Stevens’s security in Darlington Hall rests on a trust-calibrated suppression of risk awareness, and institutionalized ‘environments of risk’ parallel the household system. — connects to: Trust in persons and things sustains ontological security. — Anthony Giddens, The Consequences of Modernity, 225; Protected systems can replace trust with probability calculations; Trust requires controlling one’s own readiness to accept risk — Niklas Luhmann, Trust and Power, 161 (+8 more)

Related

• Trust in persons and things sustains ontological security. (similarity 0.85)
• Government absorbs worst-case risks so citizens can cooperate modestly (similarity 0.84)
• Trust involves a calculable asymmetry of possible harm, while hope does not (similarity 0.82)
• Trust rests on structural system guarantees that relieve individuals of risk assessment (similarity 0.81)
• Pre-modern trust is anchored in local place rather than abstract systems. (similarity 0.80)
• Trust as a distinct social phenomenon emerged only under modern conditions of risk (similarity 0.79)
• Readiness to trust increases bearable insecurity rather than security (similarity 0.79)
• Securing a good means protecting it, not maximizing its likelihood (similarity 0.79)
• Business-as-usual stabilises trust by letting individuals feel risks are negligible. (similarity 0.79)
• System trust underwrites ontological security but yields no psychological reward (similarity 0.79)
• Trust is a distinctly modern concept tied to risk-awareness. (similarity 0.79)
• Most trust is unreflective, routinized background assumption rather than calculated risk (similarity 0.78)
• Testing trust requires a concrete setting and visible relation to one’s own risk decisions (similarity 0.78)
• Even pragmatic faith in expert systems still implies trust (similarity 0.78)

Broader Connections

• Trust in persons and things sustains ontological security. #expands (0.70) — Anthony Giddens, The Consequences of Modernity, 225
• Protected systems can replace trust with probability calculations #complicates (0.60)
• Trust requires controlling one’s own readiness to accept risk #expands (0.55) — Niklas Luhmann, Trust and Power, 161
• Sanctions support trust only while the threat remains unspoken and latent #qualifies (0.50)
• Most trust is unreflective, routinized background assumption rather than calculated risk #qualifies (0.50)