Entrenched policy outcomes can be locked in through either electoral or legislative means
Evidence
The simple point is that electoral entrenchment and legislative entrenchment are substitutable strategies for accomplishing the same basic result: locking in substantive policy outcomes. Entrenched policy outcomes can be generated either indirectly through electoral entrenchment or directly through legislative entrenchment. From the perspective of both political actors scheming to protect policy outcomes and citizens concerned with what these policy outcomes will turn out to be, the bottom line is largely the same. β Daryl Levinson and Benjamin I. Sachs, Political Entrenchment and Public Law, 161
Categorization
- XREF: connects to: When one entrenchment form is blocked, actors switch to the other β Daryl Levinson and Benjamin I. Sachs, Political Entrenchment and Public Law, 160; Entrenchment can serve public ends like precommitment and stability, not just self-serving power; Gerrymandered legislative majorities can nullify the results of elections they lose β Nikole Hannah-Jones et al., The 1619 Project: A New American Originβ¦, 656 (+9 more)
Broader Connections
- Gerrymandered legislative majorities can nullify the results of elections they lose
#exemplifies(0.82) β Nikole Hannah-Jones et al., The 1619 Project, 656 - State admission policy can entrench policy by selectively admitting states.
#exemplifies(0.78) - Functional political entrenchment works without changing formal legal rules
#qualifies(0.75) β Daryl Levinson and Benjamin I. Sachs, Political Entrenchment and Public Law, 173 - Electoral-counting compromises institutionalized moral compromises into law
#exemplifies(0.72) β Albert Bandura, Moral Disengagement, 116