Long-term contracts can paralyze even prospective legislative power
Evidence
The contract clause makes the private lawmaker vro tanto superior to the legislature. In the case of contracts calling only for a single performance in the near future, or similar short-term agreements, this phenomenon need arouse no concern. But contracts may call also for a series of performances, or for inaction, over a long period of time. To the extent that the contract clause applies to agreements of this kind, it has possibilities of a serious paralysis of legislative power, preventing not merely the retrospective operation of statutes, but in a real sense their prospective operation also. — Henry M. Hart, Jr. and Albert M. Sacks, The Legal Process, 3010
Categorization
- XREF: Directly relevant to environmental/climate regulation where existing long-term leases and easements constrain lawmaking — ties into the polyad’s land-place thread. — connects to: Private contracts can functionally entrench policy by making future change extremely expensive — Daryl Levinson and Benjamin I. Sachs, Political Entrenchment and Public Law, 163; Government contracts can control private conduct by inducement rather than regulation — Henry M. Hart, Jr. and Albert M. Sacks, The Legal Process: Basic Problems in…, 837; Entrenched policy outcomes can be locked in through either electoral or legislative means — Daryl Levinson and Benjamin I. Sachs, Political Entrenchment and Public Law, 161
Broader Connections
- Private contracts can functionally entrench policy by making future change extremely expensive
#expands(0.82) — Daryl Levinson and Benjamin I. Sachs, Political Entrenchment and Public Law, 163 - Entrenched policy outcomes can be locked in through either electoral or legislative means
#expands(0.72) — Daryl Levinson and Benjamin I. Sachs, Political Entrenchment and Public Law, 161 - Government contracts can control private conduct by inducement rather than regulation
#qualifies(0.70) — Henry M. Hart, Jr. and Albert M. Sacks, The Legal Process, 837