Entrenchment can serve public ends like precommitment and stability, not just self-serving power
Evidence
[A] political party in power might undertake to ensure the survival of its policies against the contingency of future political defeat by entering contracts that could make changes in policy extremely expensive. Proregulatory forces might enter long-term contracts with private entities for expensive regulatory services; antiregulatory forces might contract with the private sector to reimburse it for the costs of any future changes in regulation; small-government proponents might enter contracts promising compensation for any increase in taxes; biggovernment proponents might enter long-term employment contracts with government workers. By making it difficult or impossible to change policies once put in place, incumbent officials could thwart the possibility of democratic changes to public policy. — Daryl Levinson and Benjamin I. Sachs, Political Entrenchment and Public Law, 163 (
#exemplifies, via linked claim)
As the previous Part surveyed, concerns about entrenchment in public law have been focused on formal legal rules that create impediments to political change—rules of election law that increase the difficulty of replacing incumbents or prevailing political parties in office or rules about legislation that increase the difficulty of revising enacted policies. But political entrenchment can also be accomplished without any shift in the legal rules directly governing permissible processes of political change. As this Part describes, what electoral and legislative entrenchment accomplish formally and legally can also be accomplished functionally and politically. — Daryl Levinson and Benjamin I. Sachs, Political Entrenchment and Public Law, 173 (
#qualifies, via linked claim)
Categorization
- XREF: connects to: Political entrenchment means making political change more difficult than it otherwise would be; Political entrenchment operates through informal and coercive means, not only formal legal rules — Daryl Levinson and Benjamin I. Sachs, Political Entrenchment and Public Law, 48; Functional political entrenchment works without changing formal legal rules — Daryl Levinson and Benjamin I. Sachs, Political Entrenchment and Public Law, 173 (+3 more)
Related
- Private contracts can functionally entrench policy by making future change extremely expensive (similarity 0.92)
- Functional political entrenchment works without changing formal legal rules (similarity 0.87)
- Political entrenchment means making political change more difficult than it otherwise would be (similarity 0.84)
- Political entrenchment operates through informal and coercive means, not only formal legal rules (similarity 0.83)
- Entrenched policy outcomes can be locked in through either electoral or legislative means (similarity 0.81)
- Policy persistence from popularity is not entrenchment; only nonresponsiveness to preference shifts is (similarity 0.79)
- Daryl Levinson and Benjamin I. Sachs — Political Entrenchment and Public Law (similarity 0.78)
- Seemingly substantive policy domains conceal underlying partisan self-entrenchment battles. (similarity 0.78)
Broader Connections
- Some policies are self-consciously designed to entrench themselves and their creators.
#responds-to(0.90) - Functional political entrenchment works without changing formal legal rules
#qualifies(0.85) — Daryl Levinson and Benjamin I. Sachs, Political Entrenchment and Public Law, 173 - Private contracts can functionally entrench policy by making future change extremely expensive
#exemplifies(0.85) — Daryl Levinson and Benjamin I. Sachs, Political Entrenchment and Public Law, 163 - Entrenched policy outcomes can be locked in through either electoral or legislative means
#expands(0.80) — Daryl Levinson and Benjamin I. Sachs, Political Entrenchment and Public Law, 161