Elite policy expertise implies no inclination to serve the common good

Evidence

But we tend to doubt it. We believe instead that— collectively—ordinary citizens generally know their own values and interests pretty well, and that their expressed policy preferences are worthy of respect. Moreover, we are not so sure about the informational advantages of elites. Yes, detailed policy knowledge tends to rise with income and status. Surely wealthy Americans and corporate executives tend to know a lot about tax and regulatory policies that directly affect them. But how much do they know about the human impact of Social Security, Medicare, food stamps, or unemployment insurance, none of which is likely to be crucial to their own well-being? Most important, we see no reason to think that informational expertise is always accompanied by an inclination to transcend one’s own interests or a determination to work for the common good. — Martin Gilens and Benjamin I. Page, Testing Theories of American Politics, 139

Categorization

• XREF: The argument that elite informational advantages don’t entail virtuous motives is symmetrical to Olson/Stigler views and the epistemic-democracy debate; also echoes Schattschneider’s mobilization-of-bias critique. — connects to: Defending experts does not entail granting them authority over political decisions — Russell Muirhead and Nancy L. Rosenblum, A Lot of People Are Saying: The New…, 270; Congruence between policy and affluent preferences cannot distinguish blocking from enacting power. — Mikael Persson and Anders Sundell, Blocking the Poor: Status Quo Bias in…, 28; Policy congruence favors the rich only where policy rarely changes — Mikael Persson and Anders Sundell, Blocking the Poor: Status Quo Bias in…, 84 (+5 more)

Broader Connections

• U.S. policy responds to elites and interest groups, not the public. #corroborates (0.82) — Martin Gilens and Benjamin I. Page, Testing Theories of American Politics, 93
• The belief in bureaucratic altruism is unfalsifiable and shapes policy assumptions #expands (0.76) — Michael Lipsky, Street-Level Bureaucracy, 535
• Congruence between policy and affluent preferences cannot distinguish blocking from enacting power. #complicates (0.75) — Mikael Persson and Anders Sundell, Blocking the Poor, 28
• Appeals to common sense and proportion serve reigning power, not truth #qualifies (0.75) — Theodor W. Adorno, Minima Moralia, 84
• Policy congruence favors the rich only where policy rarely changes #qualifies (0.74) — Mikael Persson and Anders Sundell, Blocking the Poor, 84
• Philosophy that never leaves elite circles cannot transform common sense #expands (0.73) — Antonio Gramsci, Selections from the Prison Notebooks, 2464
• Defending experts does not entail granting them authority over political decisions #qualifies (0.72) — Russell Muirhead and Nancy L. Rosenblum, A Lot of People Are Saying, 270
• Efforts to reverse technocratic expertise tend to fail as mere moralism #complicates (0.72) — Antonio Gramsci, Selections from the Prison Notebooks, 332