Defending experts does not entail granting them authority over political decisions

Evidence

Specialized knowledge is essential to democracy, but we acknowledge that it is also a challenge to democracy because it raises the specter of rule by experts—what philosopher JĂŒrgen Habermas called technocracy. Our defense of knowledge-producing institutions does not imply the view that those who produce knowledge have authoritative understanding of how it should be deployed in the political world. Often what is at issue is not the scientific or philosophic truth of things as judged by the internal standards of the expert community but rather their significance and weight for the purposes of politics. What facts, arguments, and conclusions justify or condemn a decision is a matter of political judgment. That is why skepticism requires bridging the world of expertise and democratic politics, and it is most effective when institutions are designed to give it a place in decision-making. — Russell Muirhead and Nancy L. Rosenblum, A Lot of People Are Saying, 270

Categorization

  • DEFINE: Clarifies the epistemic-versus-political authority distinction that runs through the chapter.
  • SEED: The ‘science court’ and citizen jury proposals are a usable catalog of institutional designs for skepticism.
  • XREF: connects to: Use of expert knowledge, not its discovery, is properly a democratic decision — Russell Muirhead and Nancy L. Rosenblum, A Lot of People Are Saying: The New
, 271; Authority over a topic belongs to its trained practitioners, not outsiders — Norman Daniel, Islam and the West, 320; Expert knowledge use in politics is a democratic decision (+5 more)

Broader Connections