Perceived punitive costs from cooperating with successors blocked coalition formation

Evidence

What determined, then, whether the successor parties would overcome these formidable barriers? Above all, they had to convince their potential partners that the benefits of cooperation with the communist successors would outweigh the perceived costs of losing electoral or parliamentary support as a result of such cooperation. So long as either voters or other parties were perceived as likely to punish a party for cooperating with the communist successor, and so long as these costs outweighed the benefits of access to office, communist successor parties would have difficulty forming coalitions or gaining parliamentary acceptance. — Anna M. Grzymala-Busse, Redeeming The Communist Past, 1240

Categorization

• XREF: Directly addresses the reader’s core causal question: cooperation is gated by anticipated punishment, i.e. a threat/fear dynamic that outlives the material threat itself. — connects to: State unreliability cascades into mutual distrust that blocks cooperation; Ideological proximity could hinder rather than help coalition formation — Anna M. Grzymala-Busse, Redeeming The Communist Past: The…, 1244; Cooperation requires trust as assurance against defection by non-dependent parties — Diego Gambetta, Trust - Making and Breaking Cooperative…, 178 (+3 more)

Broader Connections

• State unreliability cascades into mutual distrust that blocks cooperation #expands (0.78)
• Cooperation requires trust as assurance against defection by non-dependent parties #complicates (0.73) — Diego Gambetta, Trust - Making and Breaking Cooperative…, 178
• Ideological proximity could hinder rather than help coalition formation #contradicts (0.72) — Anna M. Grzymala-Busse, Redeeming The Communist Past, 1244