Failed court-packing attempts still worked as deterrence and delayed payoff

Evidence

Jefferson’s attacks on the judges were not a total failure. The president lost a battle but won the war. This happened again, much later, when Franklin D. Roosevelt tried to pack the court in 1937. In both cases, Congress rejected an extreme tactic. But in both cases, perhaps, the tactics may have actually worked: as deterrence, as a way to frighten judges, and in both cases, the president and his party lasted long enough to pack the bench in a perfectly legal way. — Lawrence M. Friedman, A History of American Law, 705

Categorization

• XREF: connects to: Deterrence can operate as an unintended byproduct of other actions — Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, 422; A probabilistic threat stays credible despite failures because one trial proves little — Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, 422

Broader Connections

• Deterrence can operate as an unintended byproduct of other actions #expands (0.85) — Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, 422
• A probabilistic threat stays credible despite failures because one trial proves little #expands (0.80) — Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, 422