Regime capacity to mobilize violence depends on patron-client networks and assets

Evidence

UNIP’s power had largely rested on indirect support from urban workers, which gave the unions a prominent position in Zambian politics. When the labor unions turned against UNIP in the late 1980s, individual political leaders held neither the networks nor economic power for mass mobilization (Cheeseman, 2006: 78). … The regime deployed paramilitary forces to townships, but there was no real attempt to use the security forces for UNIP’s purposes (LeBas, 2011: 217–218). — Johan Brosché and Hanne Fjelde and Kristine Höglund, Electoral violence and the legacy of…, 83

Categorization

• XREF: Echoes the mechanism studied in threatened-privilege literature: the reach of a dominant ruling coalition rests on organizational/material resources, not just the will to dominate. — connects to: Efficient use of violence requires centralized, hierarchical firm organization — Diego Gambetta, The Sicilian Mafia The Business of…, 182; Material privilege and status rewards cement loyalty to a violent regime — Albert Bandura, Moral Disengagement: How People Do Harm…, 675; Violence, values, interests, and bonds are substitutable mechanisms for securing cooperation — Diego Gambetta, Trust - Making and Breaking Cooperative…, 2213 (+1 more)

Related

• Drug-transit wealth funds armed gangs capable of eroding democracy (similarity 0.82)
• Efficient use of violence requires centralized, hierarchical firm organization (similarity 0.79)

Broader Connections

• Material privilege and status rewards cement loyalty to a violent regime #expands (0.80) — Albert Bandura, Moral Disengagement, 675
• Efficient use of violence requires centralized, hierarchical firm organization #contradicts (0.75) — Diego Gambetta, The Sicilian Mafia The Business of…, 182
• Violence, values, interests, and bonds are substitutable mechanisms for securing cooperation #corroborates (0.70) — Diego Gambetta, Trust - Making and Breaking Cooperative…, 2213