Modernization outpacing political institutions triggers revolutionary violence

Evidence

Among contemporary writers, the most influential member of the family, next to Gurr, probably is Huntington (1968). As in Pareto, the sense of deprivation in Huntington’s theory is political, though less a matter of blocked channels than of their paucity or their insufficient capacity to handle “loads.” In skeletal form: Huntington argues that revolutions and lesser forms of collective political violence are artifacts of rapid socioeconomic modernization. Such modernization “mobilizes” people and induces them to enter the arena of political conflict. No harm will be done if political channels can handle their demands and activities in pressing them. But if political development lags, blockage occurs and aggressive modes of action are generated. — John T. Jost and Jim Sidanius, Political Psychology, 4294 (#corroborates, via linked claim)

In any case, an impressive number of studies suggests that there is no simple, direct relationship between rates of socioeconomic change and political violence. The relationship, again, seems unusually ambiguous. Tanter and Midlarsky (1967) found a negative relationship between economic growth and, as they use the term, “revolutions” in Latin America, but a positive relationship in the Middle East and Asia. Bwy (1968b) confirms the Latin-American result, but argues that a different relationship among the variables holds for less developed countries. Flanigan and Fogelman (1970) find a negative relationship; Alker and Russett (1964) find the same. On the other hand, the Feierabends and Nesvold (1969) report a high association between rate of modernization and “instability.” Hibbs (1973) finds different relations between rapid change and different types of political violence. And so it goes, in a very extensive set of works. — John T. Jost and Jim Sidanius, Political Psychology, 4343 (#complicates, via linked claim)

Categorization

• XREF: connects to: Rapid opportunity shifts ignite spirals of contention reaching revolutionary extremes — Charles Tilly, Regimes and Repertoires, 280; Capacity loss in nondemocratic regimes raises collective violence, as in the post-1985 USSR. — Charles Tilly, Regimes and Repertoires, 764; Political violence arises from frustration over unmet value expectations (+4 more)

Broader Connections

• Rapid modernization triggers revolution when political institutions cannot process new demands #corroborates (1.00) — John T. Jost and Jim Sidanius, Political Psychology, 4294
• No simple direct relationship links socioeconomic change to political violence #complicates (0.85) — John T. Jost and Jim Sidanius, Political Psychology, 4343