A regime’s benefits outlast its founding purpose, so states retain it.

Evidence

A core proposition of the institutionalist literature is that regimes bring benefits to their members that can outlast their original purpose. Whether created by a dominant power (as hegemonic stability theories suggest) or states making their own calculations about the benefits of coordinated efforts (an economic rationality approach), a regime reduces both long-term and shortterm transaction costs of members by providing guidelines to their own behavior and to the behavior of others in the regime. One result is that members will usually find that maintaining a regime is less costly than creating a new one. … Thus, the situations that give rise to the formation of a regime can change, but the regime can continue because the benefits it provides—both public and private—will continue to be appreciated. — Robert B. McCalla, NATO’s persistence after the cold war, 109

Categorization

• DEFINE: Articulates the institutionalist logic of regime persistence via transaction costs and the cost asymmetry between maintaining versus founding.
• XREF: Directly the theoretical underpinning of the reader’s stated question about identity persisting after its enemy disappears. — connects to: Established regimes persist because compliance incentives and vested interests accrue over time — Robert B. McCalla, NATO’s persistence after the cold war, 114; Regime legacies persist independently of the conditions that created them; Institutions persist past their founding purpose because maintaining them costs less than replacing them.

Broader Connections

• Established regimes persist because compliance incentives and vested interests accrue over time #expands (0.92) — Robert B. McCalla, NATO’s persistence after the cold war, 114
• Regime legacies persist independently of the conditions that created them #expands (0.90)
• Institutions persist past their founding purpose because maintaining them costs less than replacing them. #expands (0.88)