A constitutional authority can end domination only if it tracks citizens’ shared interests

Evidence

The strategy of constitutional provision seeks to eliminate domination, not by enabling dominated parties to defend themselves against arbitrary interference or to deter arbitrary interferers but rather by introducing a constitutional authority—say a corporate, elective agent—to the situation. The authority will deprive other parties of the power of arbitrary interference and of the power of punishing that sort of interference. It will thereby eliminate domination of some parties by others and if it does not itself dominate those parties, then it will bring an end to domination. The reason that the constitutional authority will not itself dominate the parties involved, if it does not dominate them, is that the interference it practises has to track their interests according to their ideas; it is suitably responsive to the common good. — Philip Pettit, Republicanism, 343

Categorization

• XREF: The ‘tracking the common good’ condition is where shared positive projects enter institutional design, linking to the reader’s solidarity research question. — connects to: Interference can be non-arbitrary when institutions force officials to track citizens’ interests — Philip Pettit, Republicanism: A Theory of Freedom and…, 331; Norms can sustain regimes only while elites can plausibly invoke shared commitments — Philip Pettit, Republicanism: A Theory of Freedom and…, 47; Delegated discretionary authority need not reduce freedom when properly constrained — Frank Lovett, Republicanism, 31 (+1 more)

Broader Connections

• Interference can be non-arbitrary when institutions force officials to track citizens’ interests #qualifies (0.82) — Philip Pettit, Republicanism, 331
• Delegated discretionary authority need not reduce freedom when properly constrained #expands (0.78) — Frank Lovett, Republicanism, 31
• Norms can sustain regimes only while elites can plausibly invoke shared commitments #exemplifies (0.75) — Philip Pettit, Republicanism, 47