State interference is non-arbitrary when it tracks shared rather than exceptional interests.

Evidence

Under this conception of arbitrariness, then, an act of interference will be non-arbitrary to the extent that it is forced to track the interests and ideas of the person suffering the interference. Or, if not forced to track all of the interests and ideas of the person involved—these may make inconsistent demands—at least forced to track the relevant ones. I may have an interest in the state imposing certain taxes or in punishing certain offenders, for example, and the state may pursue these ends according to procedures that conform to my ideas about appropriate means. But I may still not want the state to impose taxes on me—I may want to be an exception—or I may think that I ought not to be punished in the appropriate manner, even though I have been convicted of an offence. In such a case, my relevant interests and ideas will be those that are shared in common with others, not those that treat me as exceptional, since the state is meant to serve others as well as me. And so in these cases the interference of the state in taxing or punishing me will not be conducted on an arbitrary basis and will not represent domination. — Philip Pettit, Republicanism, 293

Categorization

  • XREF: Relates to the reader’s research on solidarity forming through shared projects: legitimacy here rests on tracking shared, not idiosyncratic, interests — the procedural core of mutually-agreed collective action. — connects to: Interference is non-dominating when structured by shared-interest conditions and contestable penalties — Philip Pettit, Republicanism: A Theory of Freedom and…, 128; Non-arbitrary interference tracking the agent’s interests does not compromise freedom — Philip Pettit, Republicanism: A Theory of Freedom and…, 142; Arbitrary interference ignores the affected parties’ own interests and opinions — Philip Pettit, Republicanism: A Theory of Freedom and…, 291 (+3 more)

Broader Connections