Delegated discretionary authority need not reduce freedom when properly constrained

Evidence

‘Discretionary’ is much closer to the relevant meaning of arbitrary, but it is not quite right either. Discretionary power might be delegated to a public agency with a view to advancing certain policy goals or ends—as for example Congress has delegated discretionary authority to the Federal Reserve—but we would not want to say that this reduces our freedom (or, at any rate, not so long as that discretionary authority is appropriately answerable to a common knowledge understanding of the goals or ends it is meant to serve and the means it is permitted to employ). — Frank Lovett, Republicanism, 31

Categorization

  • XREF: The Federal Reserve example and ‘answerable discretionary authority’ connect to contemporary debates about administrative-state legitimacy vs. the non-delegation doctrine. — connects to: Delegated authority radiates from the apex without reducing it — Georg Simmel, The Sociology of Georg Simmel, 5417; Contestation, not collective will, legitimately constrains discretionary power. — Frank Lovett, Republicanism, 59; Non-arbitrary governance needs contestability rather than actual consent — Philip Pettit, Republicanism: A Theory of Freedom and…, 839 (+7 more)
  • corroborated: 5 independent passages support this claim — Frank Lovett, Republicanism, 31

Broader Connections