Worsening one’s own outcomes can be strategically advantageous in mixed-motive games.

Evidence

There is probably no single principle of game theory that epitomizes so strikingly the mixed-motive game as this principle that a worsening of some or even all of the potential outcomes for a particular player and an improvement in none of them may be distinctly—even dramatically—advantageous for the player so disadvantaged. It explains why a sufficiently severe and certain penalty on the payment of blackmail can protect the potential victim, how the burning of bridges behind one’s self while facing an enemy may dishearten an enemy and induce his retirement, or why a lady might, in an earlier era, defy the search party by haughtily placing the sought object in her bosom. — Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, 358

Categorization

• XREF: This is the weakness-is-strength principle; parallels how the Mafia’s credible-commitment power is built on making its own outcomes worse, not better. — connects to: Strategic wins always operate through constraining the opponent’s choice. — Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, 637; Prisoner’s dilemma arises when dominant incentives yield jointly worse results — Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, 814; Superior resources and skill can actually disadvantage a bargainer — Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, 61 (+6 more)

Related

• In mutual-dependence games possessing initiative can be a disadvantage (similarity 0.85)
• One player’s promise can worsen the other player’s position (similarity 0.80)
• One-shot strategic games can lock rational players into collectively worse outcomes. (similarity 0.80)
• Prisoner’s dilemma arises when dominant incentives yield jointly worse results (similarity 0.79)

Broader Connections

• In mutual-dependence games possessing initiative can be a disadvantage #corroborates (0.85) — Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, 202