One-shot strategic games can lock rational players into collectively worse outcomes.

Evidence

“Prisoner’s dilemma” refers, in game theory, to a configuration of payoffs that gives both players dominant incentives—in the absence of an enforceable agreement to the contrary—to choose strategies that together yield both players a less desirable outcome than if both had made opposite choices. The name derives from the problem of two prisoners, separately interrogated, who may confess to a moderate crime in common or accuse each other of a heavy crime, an accuser going free unless himself accused, the accused one or ones receiving heavy sentences. — Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, 814 (#exemplifies, via linked claim)

These are also games in which, though secrecy may play a strategic role, there is some essential need for the signaling of intentions and the meeting of minds. Finally, they are games in which what one player can do to avert mutual damage affects what another player will do to avert it, so that it is not always an advantage to possess initiative, knowledge, or freedom of choice. — Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, 202 (#complicates, via linked claim)

Categorization

• XREF: connects to: Prisoner’s dilemma arises when dominant incentives yield jointly worse results — Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, 814; In mutual-dependence games possessing initiative can be a disadvantage — Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, 202; One-shot trade games yield cheating as the unique equilibrium. — PAUL R. MILGRO, PAUL R. MILGRO - THE ROLE OF…, 46 (+1 more)

Related

• Prisoner’s dilemma arises when dominant incentives yield jointly worse results (similarity 0.93)
• One-shot trade games yield cheating as the unique equilibrium. (similarity 0.81)
• Worsening one’s own outcomes can be strategically advantageous in mixed-motive games. (similarity 0.80)
• In mutual-dependence games possessing initiative can be a disadvantage (similarity 0.79)

Broader Connections

• Prisoner’s dilemma arises when dominant incentives yield jointly worse results #exemplifies (0.95) — Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, 814
• In mutual-dependence games possessing initiative can be a disadvantage #complicates (0.72) — Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, 202