Genuine ignorance can be strategically advantageous when an opponent recognizes it.

Evidence

Another paradox of mixed-motive games is that genuine ignorance can be an advantage to a player if it is recognized and taken into account by an opponent. This paradox, which can arise either in the coordination problem or in the immunity from a threat, has no counterpart in zero-sum games. And, similarly, in a zero-sum game between rational players with full information it can never be an advantage to move first (to play the “minorant game” in the language of von Neumann and Morgenstern); in the mixed game it certainly can. — Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, 364

Categorization

• XREF: connects to: Every bargaining game ends in a simultaneous final move made in ignorance — Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, 617; Superior resources and skill can actually disadvantage a bargainer — Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, 61; Worsening one’s own outcomes can be strategically advantageous in mixed-motive games. — Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, 358 (+2 more)

Related

• Every bargaining game ends in a simultaneous final move made in ignorance (similarity 0.82)
• Superior resources and skill can actually disadvantage a bargainer (similarity 0.79)

Broader Connections

• Worsening one’s own outcomes can be strategically advantageous in mixed-motive games. #expands (0.85) — Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, 358
• Empire produces and maintains strategic ignorance as a ruling technology #exemplifies (0.75)
• Ignorance as want of knowledge derives from active ignoring as refusal to take notice. #complicates (0.72)