Wittgenstein conceives language-games as parts of an activity or form of life.

Evidence

A principal point of Wittgenstein’s concept of a language-game is to emphasize that a language or rhetorical system like law is always ā€œpart of an activity, or of a form of life.ā€ — Philip Chase Bobbitt, Reflections Inspired by My Critics, 793

Categorization

  • XREF: Directly quotes Wittgenstein’s form-of-life concept; connects to the author’s broader rejection of practice fetishism in law. — connects to: Speaking a language means assuming its entire culture and civilization.; Ethnophilosophers undermine their own thesis under Wittgenstein-Quine logic; Yet, there is scarcely a page of Wittgenstein’s work, including his work on the foundations of mathematics, that is not devoted to an attempt to rescue our understanding of meaning by linking it to the ordinary practices of human beings using language; and the many striking examples of Wittgenstein’s imaginative anthropology are testimony to his commitment to the imaginative nature of rationality. Practice fetishism and particularism may indeed culminate in the denial that human beings can conserve and transmit shared experiences and in a related refusal to recognize the imaginative elements in human rationality. But because these very ideas-how human beings learn a language, how imagination plays a crucial part in that learning-are so much at the center of Wittgenstein’s work, it casts some doubt on whether Winter’s charges of fetishism, among others, are accurate. (+8 more)

Broader Connections