Ethnophilosophers undermine their own thesis under Wittgenstein-Quine logic

Evidence

But nowhere of which I am aware does Wittgenstein claim that practice is a conceptual primitive, except as to the epistemology of some kinds of language games, which are, of course, only some kinds of forms of life. Winter confuses understanding how to play a game, for example, with understanding how to comment on it, or understanding how to depict it. Only if Wittgenstein claimed that a practice was an island, unconnected with any other practice, could such an absurd conclusion be maintained. — Philip Chase Bobbitt, Reflections Inspired by My Critics, 719 (#corroborates, via linked claim)

Categorization

  • XREF: connects to: Yet, there is scarcely a page of Wittgenstein’s work, including his work on the foundations of mathematics, that is not devoted to an attempt to rescue our understanding of meaning by linking it to the ordinary practices of human beings using language; and the many striking examples of Wittgenstein’s imaginative anthropology are testimony to his commitment to the imaginative nature of rationality. Practice fetishism and particularism may indeed culminate in the denial that human beings can conserve and transmit shared experiences and in a related refusal to recognize the imaginative elements in human rationality. But because these very ideas-how human beings learn a language, how imagination plays a crucial part in that learning-are so much at the center of Wittgenstein’s work, it casts some doubt on whether Winter’s charges of fetishism, among others, are accurate.; Quine’s indeterminacy thesis allows limited but real intercultural philosophical knowledge; Winter insists that ‘[t]he importance and ubiquity of imaginative processes such as metaphor undermine the Wittgensteinian claim that there is no more to meaning than its performative significance within a social practice.’ Is the use of ‘metaphor’ not a social practice? (+6 more)

Broader Connections