Wittgenstein never treated practice as an isolated conceptual primitive

Evidence

But nowhere of which I am aware does Wittgenstein claim that practice is a conceptual primitive, except as to the epistemology of some kinds of language games, which are, of course, only some kinds of forms of life. Winter confuses understanding how to play a game, for example, with understanding how to comment on it, or understanding how to depict it. Only if Wittgenstein claimed that a practice was an island, unconnected with any other practice, could such an absurd conclusion be maintained. — Philip Chase Bobbitt, Reflections Inspired by My Critics, 719

Categorization

• XREF: Connects to Wittgenstein’s language-game philosophy and the playing-versus-describing distinction familiar from ordinary language philosophy. — connects to: Ethnophilosophers undermine their own thesis under Wittgenstein-Quine logic; There is scarcely a page of Wittgenstein’s work, including his work on the foundations of mathematics, that is not devoted to an attempt to rescue our understanding of meaning by linking it to the ordinary practices of human beings using language; and the many striking examples of Wittgenstein’s imaginative anthropology are testimony to his commitment to the imaginative nature of rationality.; Winter insists that ‘[t]he importance and ubiquity of imaginative processes such as metaphor undermine the Wittgensteinian claim that there is no more to meaning than its performative significance within a social practice.’ Is the use of ‘metaphor’ not a social practice? (+4 more)

Related

• Ethnophilosophers undermine their own thesis under Wittgenstein-Quine logic (similarity 0.92)
• Winter insists that ‘the importance and ubiquity of imaginative processes such as metaphor undermine the Wittgensteinian claim that there is no more to meaning than its performative significance… (similarity 0.91)
• Understanding a linguistic practice does not require understanding larger social practices first. (similarity 0.88)
• Wittgenstein conceives language-games as parts of an activity or form of life. (similarity 0.87)
• Wittgenstein’s teaching-by-examples passage actually supports, not refutes, saying things about practices. (similarity 0.86)
• Wittgenstein denies psychological effects any necessary role in meaning while not denying their reality. (similarity 0.86)
• Yet, there is scarcely a page of Wittgenstein’s work, including his work on the foundations of mathematics, that is not devoted to an attempt to rescue our understanding of meaning by linking it… (similarity 0.84)
• Winter’s entire essay is structured around such small coups de theatre, which culminate in announcements of such banality that they are made ludicrous by the portentous, jargon-ridden analysis… (similarity 0.82)
• Winter is not writing about Wittgenstein, but about the Wittgensteinian account, which I fear must mean me. (similarity 0.81)
• Winter misrepresents Wittgenstein by attributing to him a composite of several thinkers’ views. (similarity 0.81)
• Speaking a language means assuming its entire culture and civilization. (similarity 0.79)

Broader Connections

• Yet, there is scarcely a page of Wittgenstein’s work, including his work on the foundations of mathematics, that is not devoted to an attempt to rescue our understanding of meaning by linking it… #corroborates (0.75)
• Understanding a linguistic practice does not require understanding larger social practices first. #contradicts (0.55) — Philip Chase Bobbitt, Reflections Inspired by My Critics, 798