Winter insists that ‘[t]he importance and ubiquity of imaginative processes such as metaphor undermine the Wittgensteinian claim that there is no more to meaning than its performative significance within a social practice.’ Is the use of ‘metaphor’ not a social practice?
Evidence
Winter heatedly denies that he “believes that there must be ‘something standing between the Constitution and our understanding of it … I have argued, in contrast, that . . ‘the meaning of [the Court’s] constitutional interpretation is as much a matter of… our interpretive commitments, as it is a matter of the understanding of the Justices.’"" g And here one begins to see the problem: What exactly does Winter think this “understanding” consists in? If it is a matter of interpretive commitments, objectified sedimentations, and the like, then is Winter’s outrage really justified? — Philip Chase Bobbitt, Reflections Inspired by My Critics, 366 (
#complicates, via linked claim)
A principal point of Wittgenstein’s concept of a language-game is to emphasize that a language or rhetorical system like law is always “part of an activity, or of a form of life.” — Philip Chase Bobbitt, Reflections Inspired by My Critics, 793 (
#expands, via linked claim)
But nowhere of which I am aware does Wittgenstein claim that practice is a conceptual primitive, except as to the epistemology of some kinds of language games, which are, of course, only some kinds of forms of life. Winter confuses understanding how to play a game, for example, with understanding how to comment on it, or understanding how to depict it. Only if Wittgenstein claimed that a practice was an island, unconnected with any other practice, could such an absurd conclusion be maintained. — Philip Chase Bobbitt, Reflections Inspired by My Critics, 719 (
#qualifies, via linked claim)
Categorization
- XREF: connects to: Ethnophilosophers undermine their own thesis under Wittgenstein-Quine logic; Meaning arises from articulating linguistic systems rather than reflecting the world; There is scarcely a page of Wittgenstein’s work, including his work on the foundations of mathematics, that is not devoted to an attempt to rescue our understanding of meaning by linking it to the ordinary practices of human beings using language; and the many striking examples of Wittgenstein’s imaginative anthropology are testimony to his commitment to the imaginative nature of rationality. (+10 more)
Related
- Wittgenstein never treated practice as an isolated conceptual primitive (similarity 0.91)
- Winter’s entire essay is structured around such small coups de theatre, which culminate in announcements of such banality that they are made ludicrous by the portentous, jargon-ridden analysis… (similarity 0.91)
- Yet, there is scarcely a page of Wittgenstein’s work, including his work on the foundations of mathematics, that is not devoted to an attempt to rescue our understanding of meaning by linking it… (similarity 0.90)
- Ethnophilosophers undermine their own thesis under Wittgenstein-Quine logic (similarity 0.89)
- Winter is not writing about Wittgenstein, but about the Wittgensteinian account, which I fear must mean me. (similarity 0.89)
- Winter misrepresents Wittgenstein by attributing to him a composite of several thinkers’ views. (similarity 0.85)
- Wittgenstein conceives language-games as parts of an activity or form of life. (similarity 0.85)
- Wittgenstein denies psychological effects any necessary role in meaning while not denying their reality. (similarity 0.85)
- Understanding a linguistic practice does not require understanding larger social practices first. (similarity 0.84)
- Winter’s denial may be inconsistent with his own theory of meaning (similarity 0.84)
- Wittgenstein’s teaching-by-examples passage actually supports, not refutes, saying things about practices. (similarity 0.78)
- Meaning arises from articulating linguistic systems rather than reflecting the world (similarity 0.78)
Broader Connections
- Winter’s denial may be inconsistent with his own theory of meaning
#complicates(0.75) — Philip Chase Bobbitt, Reflections Inspired by My Critics, 366 - Wittgenstein conceives language-games as parts of an activity or form of life.
#expands(0.70) — Philip Chase Bobbitt, Reflections Inspired by My Critics, 793 - Wittgenstein never treated practice as an isolated conceptual primitive
#qualifies(0.60) — Philip Chase Bobbitt, Reflections Inspired by My Critics, 719 - Cartesian metaphors valid for small facts fail on big contested ones
#exemplifies(0.45) — James W. Carey, Communication as Culture- Essays on…, 359 - Representation metaphors suited to small assertions fail on large debatable ones
#exemplifies(0.40)