Representation metaphors suited to small assertions fail on large debatable ones

Evidence

One does not have to rehearse the well-known phenomenological and ethnomethodological critiques of official records and tables to see in Lippmann the classic fallacy of the Cartesian tradition, to wit: the belief that metaphors of vision, correspondence, mapping, picturing, and representation that apply to small routine assertions (the rose is red; the Cubs lost 7–5; IBM is selling at 67 1/2) will apply equally to large debatable ones. Numbers may picture the stock market, but they will not tell you what is going on in Central America or, alas, what we should do about Eastern Europe. — James W. Carey, Communication as Culture- Essays on…, 359 (#corroborates, via linked claim)

Categorization

• corroborated: 2 independent passages support this claim
• XREF: connects to: Public opinion forms only through discussion, not correct representations — James W. Carey, Communication as Culture- Essays on…, 372; Cartesian metaphors valid for small facts fail on big contested ones — James W. Carey, Communication as Culture- Essays on…, 359; Representation is a distinct, identifiable category or principle (+4 more)

Related

• Cartesian metaphors valid for small facts fail on big contested ones (similarity 0.92)
• Rigorous methods reveal narrower slices of reality (similarity 0.87)

Broader Connections

• Cartesian metaphors valid for small facts fail on big contested ones #corroborates (0.95) — James W. Carey, Communication as Culture- Essays on…, 359