Ethics cannot supply a general rule for when to trust

Evidence

Ethics posed the question of whether trust was rational, right and morally necessary but it was incapable of resolution. Some preference for trust can be perceived in the statements cited in Chapter 1,1 but such a preference cannot be expressed without reservations. There are obviously some cases which call for trust and other cases which call for distrust. This is rationally indisputable. It therefore follows that trust cannot be a maxim for conduct which is valid without exception. Ethics must, therefore, presuppose that whether in particular instances one should trust or not follows from the objective features of the situation, from common human understanding. Therefore, even if a general rule is formulated about trust as a principle, the decision as to whether it should be followed or not must be delegated and left to the situation. Furthermore, it must be presumed that the situation, and in particular the object of trust, displays sufficient objective features to ground a judgement that can serve the development of trust, and that these features can have the same meaning for all people and the same relevance for trust. Only thanks to these basic suppositions, which conceive the world as consisting of multiple forms and pervaded by malice and deceit but nevertheless socially objectified and stable, could the ethical mode of treating the problem be meaningful. — Niklas Luhmann, Trust and Power, 302

Categorization

• XREF: Connects to the reader’s thesis: ethical trust requires objectifiable situations, which is exactly what Stevens in The Remains of the Day lacks — he delegates trust-decision to his role, not to the situation. — connects to: Moral hazard logic destroys trust because trust requires rule ambiguity — Mark Blyth, Austerity: The History of a Dangerous…, 430