The Other’s worldly presence is not analytically derivable from its transcendent subjectivity.

Evidence

The Other’s presence in the world can not be derived analytically from the presence of the Other-as-subject to me, for this original presence is transcendent—i.e., being-beyond-the-world. I believed that the Other was present in the room, but I was mistaken. He was not there. He was “absent.” What then is absence? — Jean-Paul Sartre, Being and Nothingness, 764

Categorization

• DEFINE: Poses the question of absence as distinct from both presence and nothingness, a structural crux for how the Other enters the world.
• QUESTION: What exactly does Sartre mean by absence here — is it a mode of the Other’s transcendence or a negation in the world? Worth chasing in the next paragraphs.
• XREF: connects to: The Other escapes phenomenological reduction and is not in the world — Jean-Paul Sartre, Being and Nothingness: An Essay on…, 752; The existence of Others is a contingent primary event, not derivable from the for-itself; The Other’s existence is a contingent but unprovable necessity. (+2 more)
• yield-rescued: below the book’s yield-target cutoff, included anyway for connecting to: The Other escapes phenomenological reduction and is not in the world — Jean-Paul Sartre, Being and Nothingness: An Essay on…, 752; The existence of Others is a contingent primary event, not derivable from the for-itself; The Other’s existence is a contingent but unprovable necessity. (+2 more)

Broader Connections

• The existence of Others is a contingent primary event, not derivable from the for-itself #corroborates (0.85)
• The Other escapes phenomenological reduction and is not in the world #expands (0.80) — Jean-Paul Sartre, Being and Nothingness, 752
• The Other’s existence is a contingent but unprovable necessity. #qualifies (0.70)
• The Other’s essential character is objectivity, not embodied life. #complicates (0.70)