The French army’s 1940 humiliation fueled its determination not to lose Algeria.

Evidence

If there is one factor which might be found lacking in, say, British army operations in Northern Ireland but which played an important role affecting the intensity of the war in Algeria, it was a certain peculiar determination within the regular French army that it should not be lost. This determination did not entirely spring from a belief in the sanctity of the présence française — less still from any kindred feeling for the pieds noirs — and to understand it one needs to recall sympathetically the recent history of the French army. Generals like Beaufre were captains at the time of the 1940 debacle, regimental commanders like Bigeard either N.C.O.s or lieutenants, and all remained profoundly conditioned by it. — Horne, Alistair, A Savage War of Peace- Algeria 1954-1962, 526 (#corroborates, via linked claim)

Categorization

• XREF: connects to: The French army in Algeria transformed from clumsy to effective by 1956; France’s 1940 defeat drove the army’s determination to win in Algeria — Horne, Alistair, A Savage War of Peace- Algeria 1954-1962, 526; The French army’s will to win sprang from 1940 humiliation, not colonial ideals (+3 more)

Related

• The French army’s will to win sprang from 1940 humiliation, not colonial ideals (similarity 0.97)
• France’s 1940 defeat drove the army’s determination to win in Algeria (similarity 0.97)
• Dien Bien Phu compounded 1940 in driving France to win in Algeria. (similarity 0.92)
• Dien Bien Phu humiliated the French army as badly as 1940 did (similarity 0.89)
• The 1940 defeat fatally undermined French prestige in Algerian Muslim eyes (similarity 0.89)
• Dien Bien Phu humiliated the French army more than any postwar Western defeat (similarity 0.89)
• Army officers saw the Algerian war as both career security and a noble cause. (similarity 0.88)
• The French army in Algeria transformed from clumsy to effective by 1956 (similarity 0.87)
• Dien Bien Phu’s fall shattered French military prestige and boosted Algerian recruitment (similarity 0.86)
• Algeria’s 1959 campaign rehearsed the Ludendorff pattern of battlefield success and strategic failure (similarity 0.85)
• Winning militarily while losing politically doomed the French army in Algeria (similarity 0.85)
• Rapidly shifting loyalties in wartime France weakened Algerian trust in any authority (similarity 0.85)
• Suez guaranteed eventual Algerian independence while stiffening French resolve to win. (similarity 0.84)
• The army viewed any negotiated ceasefire as toppling its war effort in Algeria (similarity 0.84)
• France’s defeat at Dien Bien Phu emboldened Algerian nationalists toward revolt (similarity 0.84)

Broader Connections

• France’s 1940 defeat drove the army’s determination to win in Algeria #corroborates (0.90) — Horne, Alistair, A Savage War of Peace- Algeria 1954-1962, 526
• The French army’s will to win sprang from 1940 humiliation, not colonial ideals #corroborates (0.80)
• Dien Bien Phu compounded 1940 in driving France to win in Algeria. #expands (0.60)
• The 1940 defeat fatally undermined French prestige in Algerian Muslim eyes #expands (0.40) — Horne, Alistair, A Savage War of Peace- Algeria 1954-1962, 116
• Suez guaranteed eventual Algerian independence while stiffening French resolve to win. #expands (0.40) — Horne, Alistair, A Savage War of Peace- Algeria 1954-1962, 496