Strategic moves work by constraining one’s own behavior to shape an opponent’s expectations.

Evidence

A strategic move is one that influences the other person’s choice, in a manner favorable to one’s self, by affecting the other person’s expectations on how one’s self will behave. One constrains the partner’s choice by constraining one’s own behavior. The object is to set up for one’s self and communicate persuasively to the other player a mode of behavior (including conditional responses to the other’s behavior) that leaves the other a simple maximization problem whose solution for him is the optimum for one’s self, and to destroy the other’s ability to do the same. — Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, 361

Categorization

• DEFINE: This is the chapter’s load-bearing definition of the strategic move and is likely being cited in the analysis of credible commitments.
• XREF: Directly the Schellingian credible-commitment mechanism the reader is mapping onto Mafia hostage mechanics and Godfather-bonds. — connects to: Even a player sure of his own restraint inherits the other’s amplified fears — Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, 471; Limits emerge through tacit jockeying and need unique focal qualities. — Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, 600; Strategic wins always operate through constraining the opponent’s choice. — Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, 637 (+10 more)

Related

• Strategic wins always operate through constraining the opponent’s choice. (similarity 0.85)
• Commitment buys first move while threat commits to a second-move response strategy (similarity 0.82)
• Commitments, promises, and threats all reduce a player’s own payoffs visibly and irreversibly (similarity 0.82)
• One player’s promise can worsen the other player’s position (similarity 0.81)
• Even a player sure of his own restraint inherits the other’s amplified fears (similarity 0.81)
• Threats only matter when players can irreversibly change the game (similarity 0.81)
• Moves reveal value systems and commit players where speech cannot (similarity 0.79)
• Mixed strategies primarily prevent the opponent’s anticipation of one’s choice. (similarity 0.79)

Broader Connections

• Commitment buys first move while threat commits to a second-move response strategy #expands (0.90) — Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, 294
• Worsening one’s own outcomes can be strategically advantageous in mixed-motive games. #exemplifies (0.85) — Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, 358
• In bargaining, seeming weakness can convert into strategic strength. #exemplifies (0.80) — Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, 130
• Even explicit bargaining relies on tacit signals to coordinate expectations #expands (0.75) — Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, 187