Obscure symbolic threats minimize exposure while maximizing terror

Evidence

The use of thugs and sadists for the collection of extortion or the guarding of prisoners, or the conspicuous delegation of authority to a military commander of known motivation, exemplifies a common means of making credible a response pattern that the original source of decision might have been thought to shrink from or to find profitless, once the threat had failed. (Just as it would be rational for a rational player to destroy his own rationality in certain game situations, either to deter a threat that might be made against him and that would be premised on his rationality or to make credible a threat that he could not otherwise commit himself to, it may also be rational for a player to select irrational partners or agents.) — Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, 332 (#complicates, via linked claim)

In Algiers, c’est la terreur…. One can no longer distinguish the brave from the cowards. Unless, as a result of living in fear, we have all become insensitive and unaware. Certainly, I don’t want to die and I absolutely do not want my children to die, but I am taking no particular precaution beyond those which have become habit over the past fortnight; limitation of going outside, expeditions to buy “in bulk”, an end to the visits of friends. But each time one of us goes out, on his return he describes an incident or reports a victim. — Horne, Alistair, A Savage War of Peace- Algeria 1954-1962, 1583 (#expands, via linked claim)

Categorization

• XREF: connects to: Mafia symbols function as threats and markers of territory in hostile environments; Selecting visibly irrational agents can make threats credible — Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, 332; Sustained terror normalizes precaution until fear becomes habit — Horne, Alistair, A Savage War of Peace- Algeria 1954-1962, 1583 (+9 more)

Related

• Selecting visibly irrational agents can make threats credible (similarity 0.81)

Broader Connections

• Blind terrorism provokes blind repression, polarizing and hardening a conflict #complicates (0.80)
• Selecting visibly irrational agents can make threats credible #complicates (0.78) — Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, 332
• Sustained terror normalizes precaution until fear becomes habit #expands (0.75) — Horne, Alistair, A Savage War of Peace- Algeria 1954-1962, 1583
• Threats fail against irrational adversaries and trapped opponents #complicates (0.75) — Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, 23
• Establishing identity and a communication line creates new exploitable threat value #expands (0.72) — Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, 326
• Terrorism fear uniquely suits political manipulation because it resists quick fixes #expands (0.72)
• Mafia secrecy is functional information control, not just cultural code #exemplifies (0.70)