Scapegoat theory rests on obsolete drive-discharge assumptions the cognitive revolution discarded.
Evidence
Scapegoat theory, however, is not well integrated into contemporary social psychology, since its foundations are firmly set in late nineteenth-century views of human irrationality, steeped in the metaphor of the steam engine (e.g., the belief that energy constantly cre ated by the mind must be “vented” in some fashion) and focused on the role of “primitive” drives and repressed emotions. The theory sits uneasily among contemporary models of prejudice informed by the “cognitive revolution” in psychology, a reaction against drive-based models that replaced the steam engine metaphor with a computer-based analogy of the mind as a rational, though imperfect, information processor (Fiske & Taylor, 1991). — Leonard S. Newman and Ralph Erber (eds.), Understanding Genocide, 721
Categorization
- XREF: Connects to the cognition-vs-drive split in stereotype research (Fiske & Taylor’s warmth/competence tradition), the very framework Glick uses to define envied outgroups. — connects to: Empirical scapegoat research collapsed in the late 1960s because evidence was inconsistent. — Leonard S. Newman and Ralph Erber (eds.), Understanding Genocide: The Social…, 724; Scapegoating stems from adaptive cognition, not psychopathology; Research on scapegoating declined as psychodynamic theories fell out of favor — John F. Dovidio, Peter Glick, Laurie A. Rudman, On the Nature of Prejudice: Fifty Years…, 1559
- SEED: Angle: how a metaphor choice (steam engine vs. computer) silently dictates which theories of mass violence are even thinkable.
Broader Connections
- Research on scapegoating declined as psychodynamic theories fell out of favor
#expands(0.90) — John F. Dovidio, Peter Glick, Laurie A. Rudman, On the Nature of Prejudice, 1559 - Scapegoating stems from adaptive cognition, not psychopathology
#corroborates(0.85)