Scapegoat targets must be stereotyped as both powerful and ill intentioned

Evidence

Scapegoating need not be the product of psychodynamic conflict, and the link between frustration and aggression is not automatic. Rather, the ideological model suggests that scapegoating occurs under a more specific set of conditions—when the causes of widespread economic or social frustrations (not separate, idiosyncratic difficulties) can plausibly, in the minds of those affected, be blamed on a particular social group (Billig, 1976; Tajfel, 1981). Plausibility is determined by prior beliefs and stereotypes that cast the targeted group as both powerful and ill intentioned, which can create fertile grounds for the acceptance of scapegoat ideologies. — Leonard S. Newman and Ralph Erber (eds.), Understanding Genocide, 847

Categorization

  • DEEPTHINKING: This replaces the frustration-aggression reflex with a two-part plausibility condition — power plus malevolence — which is exactly the invertible machinery behind ‘envious prejudice’.
  • XREF: Directly bridges to the stereotype-content model’s high-competence/low-warmth cell and to Allport’s discussion of scapegoat selection criteria. — connects to: Attributed causal power, not mere difference, produced the most lethal targeting — Leonard S. Newman and Ralph Erber (eds.), Understanding Genocide: The Social…, 799; Scapegoat targets are pre-chosen by envious stereotyping of powerful outgroups — , Rudman, Laurie A - On the Nature of…, 1593; Blame targets groups already stereotyped as capable of harm (+5 more)
  • SEED: Angle: ‘Why We Blame the Competent’ — scapegoating as a plausibility judgment about capability, not a discharge of diffuse frustration.

Broader Connections