Scapegoating stems from adaptive cognition, not psychopathology

Evidence

This model views scapegoating, even in its most extreme and unwarranted versions, as stemming from ordinarily adaptive cognitive tendencies and motives, rather than inherently irrational, maladaptive processes. It downplays Freudian defense mechanisms, emphasizing instead the role of culturally shared beliefs, stereotypes, and ideologies. Finally, it focuses on scapegoating as a collective process by which commitment to hateful ideologies becomes widely shared within a community, creating a consensus that spawns political movements (e.g., Nazism) and coordinated hostile actions (e.g., discriminatory laws, organized mass killings, etc.). — John F. Dovidio, Peter Glick, Laurie A. Rudman, On the Nature of Prejudice, 1588 (#expands, via linked claim)

Categorization

• corroborated: 2 independent passages support this claim
• XREF: connects to: Scapegoat theory rests on obsolete drive-discharge assumptions the cognitive revolution discarded. — Leonard S. Newman and Ralph Erber (eds.), Understanding Genocide: The Social…, 721; Popular psychology functions mainly to displace blame from evil actors onto prior causes; Individual psychodynamic theories cannot explain coordinated mass scapegoating (+4 more)

Broader Connections

• Extreme scapegoating arises from ordinary adaptive cognition and shared ideology, not pathology. #expands (0.95) — John F. Dovidio, Peter Glick, Laurie A. Rudman, On the Nature of Prejudice, 1588