Empirical scapegoat research collapsed in the late 1960s because evidence was inconsistent.
Evidence
The theory has a checkered past, coming in for serious criticism soon after its for mulation (Allport, 1954; Zawadzki, 1948). Research yielded inconsistent data (see Billig, 1976, chap. 5, for a review), and scapegoating was largely aban doned as an area of empirical study in the late 1960s (for a recent exception to this trend, see D. P. Green, Glaser, & Rich, 1998). The persistence of the scapegoat concept, in both popular and social-scientific discourse, seems to stem more from its intuitive appeal than from direct empirical evidence. — Leonard S. Newman and Ralph Erber (eds.), Understanding Genocide, 724
Categorization
- XREF: Cites Allport 1954, Zawadzki 1948, Billig 1976, and Green/Glaser/Rich 1998 — the literature trail for verifying or contesting Glick’s claim that the field abandoned the concept. — connects to: Research on scapegoating declined as psychodynamic theories fell out of favor — John F. Dovidio, Peter Glick, Laurie A. Rudman, On the Nature of Prejudice: Fifty Years…, 1559; Scapegoat theory rests on obsolete drive-discharge assumptions the cognitive revolution discarded. — Leonard S. Newman and Ralph Erber (eds.), Understanding Genocide: The Social…, 721
Broader Connections
- Research on scapegoating declined as psychodynamic theories fell out of favor
#expands(0.90) — John F. Dovidio, Peter Glick, Laurie A. Rudman, On the Nature of Prejudice, 1559 - Scapegoat theory rests on obsolete drive-discharge assumptions the cognitive revolution discarded.
#expands(0.85) — Leonard S. Newman and Ralph Erber (eds.), Understanding Genocide, 721