Extreme scapegoating arises from ordinary adaptive cognition and shared ideology, not pathology.
Evidence
This model views scapegoating, even in its most extreme and unwarranted versions, as stemming from ordinarily adaptive cognitive tendencies and motives, rather than inherently irrational, maladaptive processes. It downplays Freudian defense mechanisms, emphasizing instead the role of culturally shared beliefs, stereotypes, and ideologies. Finally, it focuses on scapegoating as a collective process by which commitment to hateful ideologies becomes widely shared within a community, creating a consensus that spawns political movements (e.g., Nazism) and coordinated hostile actions (e.g., discriminatory laws, organized mass killings, etc.). — John F. Dovidio, Peter Glick, Laurie A. Rudman, On the Nature of Prejudice, 1588
Categorization
- DEEPTHINKING: The claim that genocide stems from ‘ordinarily adaptive’ cognitive tendencies rather than irrational defense mechanisms reverses the comforting assumption that perpetrators are crazed or pathological — profound and disturbing.
- XREF: Resonates with Hannah Arendt’s banality of evil and with general social-psychology work on ordinary people committing atrocities; also connects to how ‘Things Fall Apart’ portrays colonial disruption as collective process.