Sanctions targeting deviants can backfire by worsening the conduct of natural compliers.

Evidence

Let us assume, then, that, however corruptible they are, people in power are not always actively corrupt; they have a natural, culturally supported tendency to think in public-spirited terms and to make their decisions on a public-spirited basis. This assumption invites us to consider the likely effects of deviant-centred sanctions, not on actively corrupt deviants, but rather on those who have an independent disposition to comply with whatever are the public norms governing their behaviour. It turns out that there are a variety of negative effects, and that these give us reason to wonder whether a deviant-centred strategy can do much or indeed any good; they point us towards ways in which the strategy may be counterproductive. However successful it is with the natural deviants, it may cause natural compliers to do worse than we might otherwise have expected. — Philip Pettit, Republicanism, 978

Categorization

  • XREF: connects to: Sanctions designed for worst-case agents alienate the majority who comply voluntarily — Philip Pettit, Republicanism: A Theory of Freedom and…, 1279; Punitive sanctions can backfire by destroying opportunities that enable desistance. — Joseph Avery, Jim Sidanius, Joel Cooper, Gregory Davis, Amanda N., Bias in the Law: A Definitive Look at…, 1074; Punitive sanctions backfire by destroying the social bonds that enable desistance (+6 more)

Broader Connections