Punitive drug sanctions may backfire by destroying desistance-promoting social opportunities

Evidence

Critics of the more punitive policies and practices note that these criminal justice sanctions had potential unintended or collateral consequences (Alexander, 2010; Tonry, 2011; Western, 2006). The collateral consequences included reduced employment, educational, marital, political, social, and other opportunities that are potentially shuttered or partially attenuated as a result of contact with the CJS. These critics noted that the increased use of criminal justice sanctions might backfire and lead to increased offending due to the fact that the sanctions reduce the very social opportunities that are central to desistance from offending (e.g., employment, marriage). Given the competing hypotheses about the intended and unintended consequences of drug sanctions, it is important to assess the effects of the rise in drug sanctions. Moreover, given the stark race differences in drug sanctions, it is also important to examine whether these effects vary by race. — Joseph Avery, Jim Sidanius, Joel Cooper, Gregory Davis, Amanda N., Bias in the Law, 1074

Categorization

• XREF: The backfire mechanism mirrors the reader’s central question: rational correction of a threat-hardened system may not produce the intended effect.
• QUESTION: The race-difference framing sets up the empirical test that presumably follows in the chapter — does deterrence work differently across racial groups?
• corroborated: 2 independent passages support this claim — Joseph Avery, Jim Sidanius, Joel Cooper, Gregory Davis, Amanda N., Bias in the Law: A Definitive Look at…, 1074