Tough new-source pollution rules can backfire by prolonging dirty existing plants.

Evidence

The once-clear distinction between new and existing stationary sources also became increasingly blurred in the 1990s because of administrative reinterpretation/clarification of long-standing statutory terms. Those who drafted the CAA had understood the environmental risks of drawing such a sharp regulatory line between new and existing sources. An existing source could, in order to avoid more stringent controls, simply stay in operation many years longer rather than build a new plant. If enough existing facilities stayed in operation long enough, the perverse result of imposing much tougher pollution controls on new sources would be more, rather than less, air pollution. — Richard J. Lazarus, The Making of Environmental Law, 764

Categorization

• XREF: Connects to the reader’s Institutional economics work on perverse incentives and regulatory design pathologies across the polyad. — connects to: Pollution control costs rise steeply as reductions increase — Richard J. Lazarus, The Making of Environmental Law, 879; Bright-line environmental rules would over-regulate harmless acts while missing real harms. — Richard J. Lazarus, The Making of Environmental Law, 105; Exempting old polluters from new-source rules prolongs their dirtier operation — Richard J. Lazarus, The Making of Environmental Law, 889 (+1 more)
• recurring: this claim recurs 2 times within its source

Broader Connections

• Exempting old polluters from new-source rules prolongs their dirtier operation #responds-to (0.95) — Richard J. Lazarus, The Making of Environmental Law, 889
• Sanctions targeting deviants can backfire by worsening the conduct of natural compliers. #expands (0.75) — Philip Pettit, Republicanism, 978