Parties able to make binding commitments outbargain those who cannot
Evidence
Suppose only part of the population belongs to the cult in which “cross my heart” is (or is believed to be) absolutely binding. If everyone knows (and is known to know) everyone else’s affiliation, those belonging to this particular cult have the advantage. They can commit themselves, the others cannot. If the buyer says “
16,000, cross my heart" his offer is final; if the seller says "19,000” he is (and is known to be) only “bargaining.” — Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, 72
Categorization
- XREF: This is the crux of the Gambetta mapping: Don Corleone belongs to a ‘cult’ (the Mafia’s honor code) whose binding word others in normal society cannot match — his commitment is final while Bonasera’s word is just bargaining. — connects to: A mafioso’s protection siding depends on the parties’ bargaining positions; Public pledges of reputation can make concessions impossible — Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, 81; Courts reason that binding successors harms the public by blocking adaptive response to change — Daryl Levinson and Benjamin I. Sachs, Political Entrenchment and Public Law, 132
- SEED: A clean analytical hook for an essay on why honor cultures and feuding institutions arise specifically where state courts fail: the ‘cult of binding words’ as a substitute for contract enforcement.